L’Unione europea respinge la politica italiana sui soccorsi in mare

Posted onAuthorFulvio Vassallo Paleologo

di Fulvio Vassallo Paleologo

Dopo giorni di attacchi furibondi contro i soccorsi operati in acque internazionali dalle navi delle Organizzazioni umanitarie,il governo Meloni incassa una evidente sconfitta a livello europeo, anche se si cerca di fare credere che le proposte italiane di regolamentazione al fine di contrastare le attività di ricerca e salvataggio nel Mediterraneo centrale siano state accolte. Basta leggere la bozza del Piano di azione già disponibile on line per verificare come non sia stata accolta la proposta italiana di indicare lo stato di bandiera della nave soccorritrice come paese responsabile per la assegnazion di un porto di sbarco sicuro. Il comandante della nave soccorritrice, senza differenze tra navi del soccorso civili e navi commerciali, deve procedere alla massima velocità al soccorso informando i paesi costieri competenti o limitrofi, chiedendo il coordinamento dei relativi MRCC (centrali di coordinamento), ma solo nei limiti in cui questi possano ganatire interventi solleciti che salvaguardino la vita umana in mare e lo sbarco in un luogo sicuro. L’operazione di soccorso si conclude solo con lo sbarco a terra, come precisa anche l’art. 10 ter del Testo Unico sull’immigrazione n.286/98, e come è ribadito dalle Convenzioni internazionali.

Nessun mezzo di informazione può continuare a diffondere informazioni false che darebbero per accolta la proposta italiana di un nuovo codice di regolamentazione dei soccorsi operati dalle ONG in acque internazionali. Continua intanto a venire alla luce la gravità delle mistificazioni diffuse dal Viminale sul comportamento delle ONG, che finalmente passano all’attacco e ristabiliscono il principio di realtà. In particolare, al punto 17 della bozza di Piano si esprime l’intenzione di promuovere una discussione in seno all’Organizzazione marittima internazionale (IMO) di Londra su un «quadro specifico e linee-guida per le imbarcazioni focalizzate nella ricerca e salvataggio», ma dificilmente l’IMO potrà adottare in tempi brevi risoluzioni che, su esclusiva sollecitazione di alcuni opaesi europei, modifichino il diritto internazionale, creando un regime discriminatorio che varrebbe soltanto per le ONG, con disposizioni prive di valenza normativa, che sarebbero poi certamente al centro di una serie di contestazioni nei tribunali nazionali ed internazionali. Nella sostanza si rimane nel solco della Raccomandazione della Commissione 2020/2365/UE del 23 settembre 2020, che non aveva avuto alcun effetto modificativo della vigente normativa europea ed internazionale sui soccorsi in mare.

Il documento elaborato dalla Commissione europea, e proposto come Piano di azione alla riunione del Consiglio dei ministri dell’interno in programma per venerdì 25 novembre, non accoglie nessuna delle richieste che il ministro dell’interno Piantedosi aveva rivolto ai partner europei, con argomenti che si rivelano in stretta adesione alle linee difensive del ministro Salvini, che nel processo di Palermo, sul caso Open Arms, cerca da tempo di criminalizzare le atività di soccorso e di chiamare in causa le responsabilità degli Stati di bandiera delle navi soccorritrici. Per liberarsi dalle responsabilità che gli vengono addebitate per avere impartito alla Open Arms nel 2019 un divieto di ingresso nel porto sicuro più vicino, divieto che venne poi contraddetto da una decisione del Tribunale ammistrativo del Lazio, e quindi dal provvedimento di sequestro della nave da parte della Procura di Agrigento, che ordinava lo sbarco immediato dei naufraghi. Come era, ed è tuttora previsto, dalle Convenzioni internazionali di diritto del mare e dal Regolamento Frontex n.656 del 2014, atti normativi vincolanti per le autorità italiane in base al richiamo al dirito sovranazionale operato dagli articoli 10 e 117 della Costituzione.

Numerosi comunicati della Commissione europea avevano respinto la tesi italiana che giustificava, soltanto nei confronti delle ONG, la mancata indicazione di un porto di sbarco sicuro, da raggiungere nel tempo più breve ragionevolmente possibile, come dettato dalle Convenzioni internazionali, dagli emendamenti e dalle Linee guida approvate dall’IMO, in favore della competenza prevalente dello Stato di bandiera (Flag State). E già nel 2020 la Raccomandazione della Commissione europea sui soccorsi in mare operati dalle ONG escludeva qualsiasi competenza primaria dello Stato di bandiera della nave soccorritrice, richiamando al contrario senza alcuna differenziazione per le navi umanitarie, le regole generalmente riconosciute sui soccorsi delle imbarcazioni in situazione di di distress (pericolo) in alto mare, L’assistenza richiesta dalle Convenzioni internazionali agli Stati di bandiera non può estendersi dunque fino alla indicazione del porto di sbarco. In passato la Gran Bretagna, la Francia, la Spagna, e la Germania avevano respinto le richieste italiane di assumere la responsabilità di coordinamento dei soccorsi per garantire lo sbarco a terra dei naufraghi in un porto indicato. dallo Stato di bandiera.

Dopo il respingimento collettivo adottato nei confronti dei naufraghi soccorsi dalla Ocean Viking, ai quaali per giorni è stato negata l’indicazione di un POS ( place of safety) e dopo il loro sbarco a Tolone, la Norvegia, stato di bandiera, della nave ribadisce oggi che l’accoglienza che garantirà a qualche decina di persone sbarcate in Francia dalla nave di SOS Mediterraneé non significa in alcun modo che possa invocarsi la tesi della responsabilità promaria dello Stato di bandiera della nave soccorritrice, per la indicazione di un porto di sbarco sicuro. Con queste premesse sarà ben difficile che a livello europeo si possa trovare un intesa che vada oltre un generico rafforzamento di Frontex e dei rapporti di collaborazione con paesi terzi che non rispettano i diriti umani, come la Libia e l’Egitto.

Sotto la spinta dei paesi europei e di Frontex, che stanno facendo affluire in Libia ingenti risorse, il governo di Tripoli ,con il supporto delle milizie colluse con i trafficanti, come nel caso di Zawia, stanno operando rastrellamenti di massa e respingimenti collettivi, verso i paesi del Sahel, ulteriore passaggio illegale e disumano verso la esternalizzazione dei controlli di frontiera voluta dall0Unione Europea. Una politica e prassi di polizia che violano la legalità interazionale ed i diritti umani perchè la Libia, che rimane un paese non sicuro, non ha mai aderito alla Convenzione di Ginevra sui rifugiati del 1951, e non riconosce alcuno status legale ai migranti che, in territorio libico, sono riconosciuti come rifugiati dall’Alto Commissariato delle Nazioni Unite per i rifugiati. Persone che andrebbero evacuate verso paesi sicuri, e non deportate verso paesi del Sahel in campi profughi non sicuri, o allontanate, dopo avere subito ogni sorta di abusi, con la prassi dei cd. “rimpatri volontari” assistiti verso i paesi di origine, nei quali non hanno prospettive di vita dignitosa e di pieno rispetto dei loro diritti fondamentali. Secondo un recente rapporto dell’ONU, i migranti in Libia, costretti ad accettare i cosiddetti “rimpatri assistiti” nei loro paesi di origine, sono spesso vittime di violazioni e abusi dei diritti umani diffusi e sistematici.

In Italia la Corte di Cassazione ha riconosciuto che la Libia non può essere qualificata come “paese terzo sicuro”, ed il Tribunale di Napoli ha condannato un comandante di un rimorchaitore italiano (Asso 28) che aveva sbarcato in Libia naufraghi soccorsi in acque internazionali. Se si cercherà di modificare le linee guida dell’IMO sui soccorsi in mare, con disposizioni che risulterebbero mirate esclusivamente contro le navi delle ONG si andrebbe contro il costante orientamento della Commissione europea e contro la recente decisione della Corte di Giustizia del’Unione Europea, sui limiti ben precisi apposti ai fermi amministrativi delle navi umanitarie. Si aprirebbero continue occasioni di contenzioso davanti ai Tribunali nazionali ed internazionali con possibili gravi ripercussioni sull’intero traffico commerciale via mare e sulla questione ancora controversa della suddivisione dei mari in zone SAR ( di ricerca e di salvataggio) di competenza, ma non rientranti nella giurisdizione esclusiva, degli Stati costieri. E’ tempo, comunque, che la finzione della zona SAR libica salti, dopo essere servita per criminalizzare i soccorsi delle ONG che non si piegavano ai comandi delle motovedette libiche, ed alla delega di decine di migliaia di respingimenti alla sedicente Guardia costiera libica, coordinata prima da assetti italiani, e poi da Frontex in concorso con le autorità maltesi ed italiane. Di certo la Libia non ha ancora oggi una Centrale unica di coordinamento dei soccorsi (MRCC), che secondo le Convenzioni internazionali dovrebbe essere la prima condizione per il riconoscimento di una zona SAR (di ricerca e salvataggio).

Preoccupa poi sul piano interno l’impatto che potrà avere l’attacco portato dal governo contro i soccorsi umanitari, soprattutto per il conflitto che si può preventivare con la magistratura che, secondo una giurisprudenza ormai consolidata, ha ritenuto la legittimità dei soccorsi umanitari in acque internazionale, che costituiscono adempimento di un dovere sancito da Convenzioni internazionali, ed ha respinto le decisioni governative, poi confluite come notizia di reato nei rapporti di polizia giudiziaria, che vietano l’ingresso nel porto sicuro più vicino o escludono la natura di evento di soccorso ( e la ricorrenza di un caso di distress) per trattare la situazione delle persone in attesa di soccorso in alto mare come un “evento migratorio”, facilmente qualificabile come illegale, e dunque tale da dismettere le responsabilità di coordinamento e gli obblighi di indicazione di un porto sicuro di sbarco. Rimane da augurarsi che le future scelte dei giudici non si facciano influenzare dagli indirizzi politici del governo in carica. Sarebbe una questione che potrebbe avere ricadute anche sul piano internazionale, con la possibile aperura di procedure di infrazione contro l’Italia da parte della Corte di Giustizia UE. Come si è già verificato nei confronti dell’Ungheria di Orban, dopo violazioni sistenatiche del diritto dell’Unione Europea e dei diritti umani sanciti dalle Convenzioni internazionali.

Una pubblicazione periodica dell’Agenzia per i diritti fondamentali dell’Unione Europea (FRA) censisce annualmente lo stato dei procedimenti penali ed amministrativi intentati a raffica contro le ONG, a partire dal 2017 (caso Iuventa). Con poche eccezioni di procedimenti ancora aperti, a Ragusa ed a Trapani,che presentano peculiarità evidenti, sono tutti procedimenti archiviati, ed in nessun caso di è arrivati ad una sentenza di condanna dei comandanti o dei capo-missione delle navi umanitarie. La tesi diffamatoria dei “taxi del mare”, o quella più risalente delle collusioni con le organizzazioni criminali che gestiscono il traffico, nelle sue diverse formulazioni (dalle consegne concordate del procedimento Iuventa alla teoria del fattore di attrazione ancora oggi ripreso nei rapporti di Frontex), sono rimaste fino ad oggi prive di un qualsiasi riscontro processuale definitivo. Mentre le archiviazioni a favore delle ONG ormai non si contano più.

Sarebbe adesso auspicabile, mentre migliaia di migranti continuano ad arrivare nei porti italiani, dopo traversate che sono sempre sul punto di concludersi in tragedia, che l’attenzione si sposti verso il ritorno delle navi militari e della guardia costiera in acque internazionali, magari con una missione europea di soccorso, e che le autorità italiane assumano quel ruolo di coordinamento dei soccorsi nel Mediterraneo centrale, che evidentemente Malta, la Libia o la Tunisia, per ragioni diverse, non sono in grado di assumere. Sarebbe questa assunzione di responsabilità che, a differenza di quanto sta avvenendo in queste settimane, potrebbe permettere al’Italia di ottenere un maggiore riconoscimento di ruolo negoziale a livello europeo, restando sul piano di una tutela effettiva dello Stato di diritto, che impone il pieno rispetto delle Convenzioni internazionali e dei Regolamenti europei approvati in passato dal nostro paese. Non è soltanto una questione di opportunità o di scelta politica, lo impone la nostra Carta Costituzionale.

AGGIORNAMENTO – DA STATEWATCH 24 novembre 2022

EU: Mediterranean migration plan underpinned by more policing and border enforcement in repressive states

An extraordinary meeting of the EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) Council will take place tomorrow to discuss migration. The European Commission has published a plan setting out the general direction for action in the central Mediterranean. Other documents obtained by Statewatch shed more light on the matter: more intensive police cooperation with repressive states and externalisation of borders instead of relocation of refugees, in full knowledge of the dire situation for people seeking safety, in particular in Libya.

The extraordinary JHA Council will discuss “the urgent challenges and joint way forward” for EU migration policy. The meeting comes in the wake of the conflict between France and Italy over the disembarkation of the Ocean Viking and the 234 people it eventually brought to safety in Toulon after rescuing them at sea near the Libya coast, and an increase in irregular journeys across the Mediterranean “of 77% compared with the same period of 2021,” says the Council.

On Wednesday at the European Parliament, the European Commissioner ‘for promoting our European way of life’, Margaritas Schinas, called for common solutions to resolve the situation in the Mediterranean: “We cannot continue working, event by event, ship by ship. Time has come for a sustainable, comprehensive, holistic European asylum and migration framework.”

The meeting tomorrow will apparently cover “the current situation along all migratory routes,” but significant attention is likely to go to the European Commission’s latest action plan on migration (pdf), “containing 20 actions designed to address the immediate and ongoing challenges along the Central Mediterranean route.”

These fall into three categories: externalising migration controls, managing search and rescue in the Mediterranean, and enforcing the ‘voluntary solidarity mechanism’ signed in June by 18 member states and three Schengen associated states.

Externalising migration control

The first actions listed in the plan concern cooperation with third countries to prevent irregular migration, and there are vast amounts of money available:

“At least EUR 580 million for 2021- 2023 under NDICI-Global Europe [Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument] and other instruments are currently foreseen to be deployed through regional multi-country programming for migration related support to partners in North Africa, alongside bilateral EU programmes with individual countries.”

One action foresees strengthening the capacity of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya to “prevent irregular departures, support more effective border and migration management, and reinforce search and rescue capacities.” A draft version of the EU’s ‘Operation Action Plan 2023: Migrant smuggling’, which is currently being discussed by officials in the Council’s internal security committee and has been seen by Statewatch, provides some more details on what that means in practice.

For example, an activity entitled ‘Central MED Route’, led by the Italian police, includes the following activities:

“Improve and make effective the real-time information exchange and the operation response, including the exchange of intelligence/information with Europol and Eurohust, to enhance investigations in source, transit and destination countries along the central Mediterranean route”

“Creation of operational and investigative taskforces to better run joint investigations and to share information in close cooperation with third country investigators”

“Tasksforces may eventually include the deployment of investigators on ad-hoc basis for short term activities for face-to-face collaboration with Northern Africa Law Enforcement and Judicial Services, ensuring cooperation with Europol, Eurojust, EUBAM [EU Border Assistance Mission Libya], ICC [International Criminal Court], MS & TP [member states and, presumably, third parties] and when necessary as well with other international organisations working in the field”

The fostering and boosting of cooperation with Libya and North African States also comes with renewed training on surveillance equipment. Just this week, an investigation by Le Monde revealed that Frontex is providing the so-called Libyan coast guard with access to its surveillance equipment.

This strengthened collaboration between police forces will, of course, do little to nothing to improve the situation for migrants in Libya, as EU member states know all too well. A Presidency discussion paper (pdf) circulated in the Council on Halloween noted that the political-military situation in Libya:

“…has had direct impact on the country’s capacities to manage migration, as well as on the conditions of the migrants present in the country’s territory, especially in terms of safeguarding their fundamental rights, improving access to basic services and protecting them from all forms of exploitation, abuse and violence, as too often demonstrated by ill-treatment of those held in detention centres.”

Managing rescues in the Mediterranean

The Commission’s action plan underlines that:

“Providing assistance to any persons found in distress at sea until the point of safe disembarkation, irrespective of the circumstances that lead people to be in such a situation, is a legal obligation for EU Member States, as established in international customary and conventional law as well as Union law.”

In which case, many would argue that the ideal solution would be for a coordinated, publicly-funded, state-led search and rescue operation in the Mediterranean. On the other hand, the Commissioner for Migration and Home Affairs, Ylva Johansson, said this week:

“The situation today with the private vessels operating at sea is a scenario which still lacks sufficient clarity… This current challenge was not thought of when maritime law was first agreed.”

This appears to be a rather partial reading of history. In response to the thousands of refugees who fled Vietnam from 1975 onwards – known as “boat people” – led to various volunteer sea rescue initiatives. The International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue was adopted in 1979 and entered into force in 1985.

In any case, Johansson called for “more cooperation between member states, flag states and coastal states and other relevant actors.” What this means in practice remains to be seen. In Italy, the new interior minister Matteo Piantedosi wants to launch a new code of conduct for rescue NGOs, following on from the disastrous 2017 code of conduct that led to multiple organizations having to halt operations in the Mediterranean.

The Commission’s action plan, meanwhile, aims for:

“…discussions in the International Maritime Organization on the need for a specific framework and guidelines for vessels having a particular focus on search and rescue activities, particularly in view of developments in the European context.”

Enforcing the voluntary solidarity mechanism

The Commission’s action plan notes that implementation of the voluntary solidarity mechanism, the latest ad-hoc measure designed to respond to the migratory pressure faced by southern EU states, needs to be stepped up.

Of the 8,000 places for the relocation of refugees that have been pledged, only 117 people have actually been relocated, while France recently announced that it will no longer take in 3,500 refugees currently in Italy, in response to the Italian government’s refusal to give safe harbour to the Ocean Viking rescue vessel.

However, relocation was only part of the “solidarity mechanism”. As Statewatch noted in June:

“…member states that do not want to relocate refugees will be able to make “a financial contribution to a benefiting Member State, or also to projects in third countries that may have a direct impact on the flows at the external border”.

The “operational conclusions” of a meeting on the mechanism on 20 October (pdf), obtained by Statewatch, show that there is clear enthusiasm for the ‘externalisation as solidarity’ possibility. The ‘MED5’ states (Malta, Cyprus, Italy, Greece and Spain) have put forward project proposals as part of the mechanism, which include:

  • Malta: “Repairs of sea vessel of the Libyan Coast Guard”
  • Italy: “Support to authorities of Tunisia, Egypt, Libya”
  • Spain: “Border controls in third countries”

Meanwhile, Czechia is working with Italy “on a border management project in Libya implemented by ICMPD [the International Centre for Migration Policy Development],” and Switzerland “confirmed its interest in projects in third countries, namely Northern Africa”.

Documentation

“Piano d’azione per il Mediterraneo centrale”

EU ACTION PLAN FOR THE CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN
In 2022 irregular arrivals to the European Union have increased across all routes confirming
once more the need to find sustainable and structural European solutions to our common
challenges based on the comprehensive approach set out in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, including renewed action on the external dimension of migration.
Adopting the Pact in all its aspects remains the main priority. In the framework of the gradual approach adopted earlier this year under the French Presidency, the Czech Presidency is advancing the discussions on solidarity balanced along with responsibility, ahead of the Justice and Home Affairs Council of 8 December 2022.
The October Justice and Home Affairs Council had addressed the recent evolutions in
the Western Balkans migratory route, which has also recently seen a large increase in
migratory movements. The discussion focused, in particular, on the visa policy of the
Western Balkan region and the key areas for cooperation with the Western Balkan partners,
identifying common initiatives to be deployed to step up European action.
Latest events have put a spotlight on the Central Mediterranean route where over 90 000
migrants and refugees arrived in 2022 departing mainly from Libya and Tunisia, and
originating primarily from Egypt, Tunisia, and Bangladesh an increase of over 50% in
comparison to 2021. Most of these arrivals reached the European Union after hazardous
journeys, and search and rescue operations at sea.
The European Union has been addressing this issue over the past years, including through
targeted outreach towards third countries (i.e., Tunisia, Egypt, and Bangladesh) to
strengthen cooperation on the fight against smuggling and targeted actions along the route (i.e., Niger) through the reinforcement of border and coast guard capacities, enhanced cooperation on return and legal migration and addressing root causes. In addition, since June this year, the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism has been in operation to provide targeted solidarity.
In view of the Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council of 25 November 2022, the
Commission is presenting this EU Action Plan to the Council, containing 20 actions
designed to address the immediate and ongoing challenges along the Central
Mediterranean route.
I. Strengthened cooperation with partner countries and international organisations
The EU continues to strengthen the strategic, policy-driven programming and
implementation of its external funding to address migratory challenges, prevent irregular
departures and save lives along all migratory routes. At least EUR 580 million for 2021-
2023 under NDICI-Global Europe and other instruments are currently foreseen to be
deployed through regional multi-country programming for migration related support to
partners in North Africa, alongside bilateral EU programmes with individual countries. This
support is strengthened further through a Team Europe approach on migration and mobilityand through the opportunities to foster economic growth, jobs and prosperity in the region under the Economic and Investment Plan for the Southern Neighbourhood.
Based on a balanced, comprehensive, and tailor-made approach laid down in the Pact, it is
necessary to step up work to:
1. Launch – before the end of the year – the Team Europe Initiative on the Central
Mediterranean route to combine Member States’ activities with cooperation and
coordination at EU level, through a whole-of-route approach, creating new opportunities
for coordination with partner countries, as well as with relevant UN Agencies.
2. Enhance operational coordination of the external action on migration, notably
through MOCADEM and the EMWP, to ensure coherence of EU and national support to
key third countries with EU migration objectives across various policy areas, as
indicated in the Pact, such as development cooperation, security, visa, trade,
agriculture, investment and employment, energy, environment and climate change, and
education.
3. Strengthen capacities of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, in particular, to develop jointly
targeted actions to prevent irregular departures, support more effective border and
migration management, and reinforce search and rescue capacities, in full respect of
fundamental rights and international obligations.
4. Develop and implement a new regional programme to fight against the smuggling
of migrants and the trafficking of human beings in North Africa. This will be
implemented in close cooperation with Member States and relevant EU Agencies, and it
will be coordinated with the continued roll-out of bilateral Anti-Smuggling Operational
Partnerships.
5. Reinforce the EU/AU/UN trilateral task force for Libya by rapidly concluding the
ongoing work on the terms of reference and setting clear and ambitious targets for 2023
concerning: (a) enhanced use of humanitarian corridors from Libya to the EU, including
through an enhanced use of Emergency Transit Mechanisms, and (b) stepped up
Voluntary Humanitarian Returns from Libya to countries of origin or safe destinations,
with the support of relevant UN Agencies. The EU will also support international
organisations and NGOs providing support to those in Libya.
6. Negotiate and swiftly conclude the working arrangement between Frontex and the
EU Border Assistance Mission in Libya (EUBAM) to support the promotion of
European integrated border management standards, situational awareness, and risk
analysis.
7. Intensify cooperation by Frontex with EUCAP Sahel Niger to speed up the full
implementation of the working arrangement. EUBAM Libya and EUCAP Sahel Niger will
also reinforce cooperation with JHA actors through the participation in EMPACT
priorities to tackle migrant smuggling and trafficking of human beings.8. Consolidate cooperation with Niger through the swift implementation of the Anti-
Smuggling Operational Partnership, the support of the EUAA through the Niger pilot
Roadmap and the implementation of the Emergency Transit Mechanism
9. Step up the implementation of the EUAA-Egypt Roadmap on support in relation to
international protection in the course of 2023.
10. Coordinate joint diplomatic demarches vis-à-vis third countries to which irregular
migrants are to be returned, in particular with the objective of achieving better practical
cooperation on readmission including through readmission agreements or
arrangements.
11. Set up quickly targeted return operations, supported by Frontex (travel document
issuance, coordination of return flights, etc.), as well as actions aimed at reintegration
support through development programming and implementation activities at national
and local level in partner countries of origin in cooperation with international
organisations. These efforts will need to be mirrored by enhanced cooperation on
returns, addressing the bottlenecks in the national return procedures, under with the
support of the EU Return Coordinator and within the framework of the High-level
network on Returns.
12. Prioritise the implementation of the Regional Development and Protection
Programme in North Africa and Niger to strengthen the protection capacity of national
institutions for registration, refugee status determination and referral mechanisms,
reception, durable solutions as well as norms, strategies, and operating procedures.
13. Accelerate the activation of the Talent Partnerships with Tunisia, Egypt, and
Bangladesh to promote international mobility and circular migration based on better
matching of labour market needs and skills.
II. A more coordinated approach on search and rescue
Providing assistance to any persons found in distress at sea until the point of safe
disembarkation, irrespective of the circumstances that lead people to be in such a situation,
is a legal obligation for EU Member States, as established in international customary and
conventional law as well as Union law. As part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, in
addition to a strong solidarity mechanism, the Commission set out a path for a common
response to search and rescue as an integral part of European Integrated Border
Management. Sincere cooperation and solidarity among Member States, as well as
coordination between all relevant actors and stakeholders, is essential to prevent fatalities at sea, maintain safety of navigation and find sustainable solutions to current challenges. To
ensure such a coordinated approach:
14. Enhance cooperation between Member States notably by: (a) gathering knowledge
and exchanging information on rules and practices applied by Member States as
regards search and rescue and (b) promoting closer cooperation, best practices, and
improved modalities for the exchange of information and coordination notably among
coastal and flag states, including with a view to facilitating better cooperation between
Member States and vessels owned or operated by private entities. 15. Frontex – together with concerned Member States – will carry out a targeted
assessment of the situation in the Central Mediterranean to identify needs for reinforced
support through joint operations, aerial and maritime surveillance, capacity building, and
situational awareness for Member States at the external borders.
16. Promote – in close cooperation with UNHCR and IOM – dialogue between
Mediterranean coastal states on regional approaches to search and rescue, based on
solidarity, international cooperation, and partnership.
17. Promote discussions in the International Maritime Organization on the need for a
specific framework and guidelines for vessels having a particular focus on search and
rescue activities, particularly in view of developments in the European context.
The Commission, with the participation and support of Member States, will relaunch the
European Contact Group on Search and Rescue, inviting as appropriate partner
countries, international organisations, and stakeholders.
III. Reinforced implementation of the Voluntary Solidarity Mechanism and the Joint
Roadmap
The Solidarity Declaration agreed on 22 June 2022 provides a voluntary and temporary
solidarity mechanism for one year offering an opportunity for lessons learned and bridging
towards the future permanent system under the Pact. Member States need to accelerate the implementation of the mechanism addressing the bottlenecks that have been identified so far, enhancing flexibility, streamlining processes, and implementing the financing of
alternative measures. To this end:
18. The Solidarity Platform will revise the Standard Operating Procedures for relocation
to achieve more efficient and quicker procedures, including to provide swift support to
Member States receiving arrivals by sea.
19. The Solidarity Platform will match proposed projects and financial contributions to
start implementing the alternative measures of solidarity through projects coherent
with the activities and needs identified. The links between the voluntary solidarity
mechanism and actions envisaged in the external dimension of migration will also be
strengthened.
20. The EUAA will prioritise support to Member States in the swift implementation of the
voluntary solidarity mechanism through its tools and operating plans.
The Solidarity Platform will continue coordinating the implementation of the mechanism,
identify ways of improving it and consider additional pledges as needed.
In line with the Joint Roadmap agreed between the European Parliament and the
Council, the co-legislators, with the support of the Commission, will enable the adoption of
all the proposals under the Pact on Migration and Asylum before the end of this legislative
term to ensure that a sustainable solution is put in place balancing solidarity and
responsibility.
***The EU and the Member States will need to work jointly to achieve the goals set in this
Action Plan and to ensure its effective implementation. Reporting and monitoring through the existing Commission and Council mechanisms will be essential.
The EU needs to remain vigilant about the developments of the other key migratory routes to Europe including along the Türkiye/Eastern Mediterranean route, the Western
Mediterranean/Atlantic route, as well as along the Western Balkans migratory route. This
Action Plan may act as a model to develop similar plans addressing the specificities of other
migratory routes